

# Security analysis of a blockchainbased protocol for the certification of academic credentials


Marco Baldi, Franco Chiaraluce, Migelan Kodra and Luca Spalazzi

Università Politecnica delle Marche

Ancona




### Premises and motivation



Marilee Jones, the dean of admissions at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, became well known for urging stressed-out
students competing for elite colleges to calm down and stop trying
to be perfect. Yesterday she admitted that she had fabricated her
own educational credentials, and resigned after nearly three
decades at M.I.T. Officials of the institute said she did not have
even an undergraduate degree.

# Open Badges


✓ Developed by the Mozilla Foundation in collaboration with the McArthur Foundation.



> The Open Badges standard provides a tool for implementing digital, enriched versions of competence certificates and academic credentials.

### **Blockcerts**





### Use cases



Università degli Studi di Padova





Massachusetts Institute of Technology



MINISTRY FOR EDUCATION AND EMPLOYMENT







SECRETARÍA DE EDUCACIÓN

# Blockcerts (ctd.)


What about the security?

- ➤ Each certificate must contain all the necessary information for its validation through the blockchain, including a reference to the public key of the issuer to be used for its validation.
- > Such a feature, though allowing decentralized validation, opens the door to possible <u>forgery attacks</u>.


# An example of forgery




# Sequence flow of the Blockcerts system



# Issuing Certificates




# **Blockchain Receipt**




# Certificate authenticity

> Step 1: The **hash** of the certificate matches the value in the receipt.



# Certificate Authenticity

> Step 2: The Merkle Path is valid.



# Certificate Authenticity


> <u>Step 3</u>: The **Merkle Root** stored on the blockchain matches the value in the receipt.



### Hosted Issuer Profile

```
♥@context:
    0:
                    "https://w3id.org/openbadges/v2"
                    "https://w3id.org/blockcerts/v2"
    1:
▼id:
                    "https://raw.githubusercontent.com/student3671/docs/master/issuer-info-eth.json"
                    "https://www.univpm.it/Entra/"
 url:
                    "Università Politecnica delle Marche"
 name:
                    "info@univpm.it"
 email:
▶ image:
                    "...gDPhZawAAAAASUVORK5CYII="
▼publicKey:
  ▼0:
                    "ecdsa-koblitz-pubkey:0x1344f156c961c8BDa7AF9d03fB2b1734E667E151"
     ▼id:
                    "2019-06-12T10:39:36.861480+00:00"
      created:
▶ revocationList:
                    "https://www.blockcerts.o...cation-list-testnet.json"
                    "Profile"
 type:
```

# Issuer Identity Verification



# Blockcerts vulnerability

- ➤ The Blockcerts protocol does not verify that the *issuer\_id* extracted from a certificate indeed points to a web address that is owned by the legitimate issuing.
- > This allows hijacking of the verifier towards a fake issuer profile, which can perfectly resemble the one of the legitimate institution.
- ➤ A fake issuer profile was created for the Università Politecnica delle Marche and hosted on a Github domain.
- During the verification process, the Blockcerts protocol checks the public key on the blockchain transaction corresponding to the certificate, and compares it with the key included in the issuer profile published online.
- > This brings to a successful verification through Blockcerts, and to a forged certificate that is practically indistinguishable from a legitimate one.



#### Master's Degree in Electronic Engineering

#### Migelan Kodra

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#### Format validation

Hide \*

Getting transaction ID

Computing local hash

Fetching remote hash

Getting issuer profile

Parsing issuer keys



#### Hash comparison

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Comparing hashes

Checking Merkle Root

Checking Receipt



#### Status check

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Checking Revoked Status


Checking Authenticity

Checking Expiration Date



#### Verified

This is a valid Ethereum certificate. View transaction link



### Possible countermeasures

- 1. Replacing the issuer profile referenced from the *issuer\_id* field with a digital certificate containing the public key of the issuing institution, and released by an accredited certification authority.
- 2. Applying Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs), based on initiatives like those in [5]:
  - W3C Community Group Decentralized Identifier,
  - W3C Working Group Verifiable Claims,
  - DIF DID Auth.

[5] CEN/CENELEC Focus Group BDLT, "Recommendations for successful adoption in Europe of emerging technical standards on distributed ledger/blockchain technologies," Tech. Rep., Jul 2018.

### Conclusions

- > The Blockcerts protocol does not provide any strong mechanism for authenticating the issuing institution, since the issuer authentication is basically performed on the basis of an unauthenticated issuer profile available online and referenced from inside the certificate.
- > A legitimate issuing institution can be easily impersonated by suitably fabricating a fake issuer profile.
- > Apparently legitimate academic credentials can be released, which the Blockcerts validation mechanisms are unable to distinguish from valid academic credentials issued by the legitimate institution.
- > This clearly highlights a vulnerability of this protocol, especially when it is used for the certification of academic credentials with legal value.
- > Suitable countermeasures can be conceived, that however are currently under development, and cannot provide an immediate solution to the highlighted vulnerability.

# Thank you

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